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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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TRENDS

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CHINA

CHOU REAFFIRMS TENETS OF PEKING'S OPEN-DOOR FOREIGN POLICY

In the wake of the new upsurge in the "people's war" against Lin Piao and Confucius, Chou En-lai has used the occasion of the 21-24 February Peking visit by Zambian President Kaunda to serve notice that the present campaign will not disrupt Peking's adroit foreign policy of recent years. Chou's first public reference to the anti-Confucius campaign--to a foreign audience at a 24 February banquet speech--appeared aimed at reassuring his guests, as well as the larger international audience, that the nationwide assault against Lin and Confucius is limited to domestic objectives. Chou emphasized that the campaign is under CCP organizational control, and he narrowly defined it as a "continuation and deepening of the movement to criticize Lin Piao and rectify the style of work."

Chou's remarks during President Kaunda's visit, his first public speeches since 10 December 1973 when he welcomed the visiting Nepal King, are the most authoritative statements on foreign affairs by a Chinese leader since the anti-Confucius campaign escalated in January. Only two other Politburo members, Wei Kuo-ching and Chen Yung-kuei, have spoken out publicly on the campaign. Wei relegated criticism of Lin and Confucius to workers' "spare time," while Chen stressed the need to use the campaign to stimulate production.

Chou's apparent desire to hold the special issue of detente with the United States safely above the surging campaign was suggested by his failure to mention "imperialism," the codeword for the United States, among those "foreign diehards" opposed to the campaign. Lashing out only at Taipei and Moscow, Chou expressed China's determination to develop the spirit of "proletarian internationalism" and to make a "greater contribution" to the people of the world.

At an earlier banquet on the 21st Chou had expressed Peking's continued confidence that the general state of "disorder" in international affairs, stemming chiefly from U.S.-Soviet rivalry, would provide sustained opportunity for expedient Chinese maneuvering within the triangular relationship. Consistent with the more orthodox Marxist viewpoints evident

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in PRC coverage of foreign events in recent weeks, Chou salted his remarks with stock Marxist slogans calling attention to popular opposition to oppression abroad, especially in capitalist countries--a subject Peking has softened in recent years in an effort to enhance its international image and to gain wider diplomatic recognition. Chou particularly hailed popular struggles in capitalist countries against "intensified exploitation by monopoly capital"--his first such reference since an 18 June 1968 banquet speech for Tanzanian President Nyerere in which he lauded the "revolutionary mass movement" then allegedly sweeping "the heartland of the capitalist world." Chou also expressed confidence that world reactionaries would eventually be overcome by "the people, comprising more than 90 percent of the world's population,"--a strident formulation of international division frequently employed during the Cultural Revolution that Chou last voiced in a September 1968 DRV National Day speech in Peking.

PEKING MEDIA ON
FOREIGN AFFAIRS

While the bulk of Chinese comment and reportage on foreign affairs still reflects the stability and continuity of Chou's flexible approach, some recent PRC reports on world events have reflected renewed concern over alleged popular oppression abroad and have also taken a harder line than that of the recent past on more peripheral foreign issues. For example, Peking has increased its attention to labor struggles in West Europe and has revived its past practice of replaying commentaries from pro-Peking communist parties on struggles in Southeast Asian states such as Malaysia and the Philippines. Recent comment on the United States and Japan has pointed out reportedly anti-popular, anti-China elements. A 30 January PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, as another example, denounced the "spectre of John Foster Dulles" evident among "a bunch of American imperialists" who had praised an allegedly anti-China documentary by Italian film director Antonioni. Peking has also revived charges against Japanese "militarism" in singling out for criticism the Seirankai rightwing faction within Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).

On the critical foreign policy issues such as SALT and other East-West disarmament forums, however, Peking media continue to express confidence in the validity of a flexible approach

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to foreign problems in view of the "stalemate" caused by superpower contention.* Peking continues to lambast Moscow, even to the point of using alleged Soviet support of Confucius as a club to destroy domestic backers of the ancient sage, but it remains discreet toward the United States. Peking virtually ignored President Nixon's State of the Union address and treated his budget, defense, and economic messages in much the same manner as last year. And PRC propagandists tempered the initial attack on the Seirankai by reporting subsequently Prime Minister Tanaka's efforts to improve LDP discipline and bring the rightwing faction into line.

The Chinese have also striven to maintain the momentum of their policies toward the U.S. relationship with West Europe and toward PRC relations with noncommunist Southeast Asian states. For example, a 4 February NCNA replay of a Norwegian statement ignored past Peking support for popular Icelandic objections and offered initial Chinese sanction for the maintenance of the U.S. airbase under NATO auspices in Keflavik. A 14 February NCNA report on Australian Prime Minister's Whitlam's recent tour of Southeast Asia reaffirmed positive Chinese interest in ASEAN and indirectly noted, for the first time in recent years, Chinese interest in joining such a regional Asian body.

* For a discussion see 21 February 1974 TRENDS page 9.

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EAST-WEST RELATIONS

USSR MILITARY LEADERS HAIL DETENTE, EMPHASIZE STRENGTH

Soviet military leaders commenting on the armed forces' 56th anniversary on 23 February again presented, as they had last year, a less pessimistic assessment of the international situation than had been traditional. Not unexpectedly, however, these leaders maintained in now ritualistic terms that detente has not proceeded far enough to allow any weakening of Soviet military might. Both themes were present in Defense Minister Grechko's article in the 23 February PRAVDA.

Grechko's assessment of the progress of detente was notably more sanguine than the view he advanced in a PRAVDA anniversary article last year. While then he had said only that Moscow "is doing everything possible to eliminate the threat of a new world war," this year he concluded that "the possibilities for unleashing new wars have been severely limited" and that "real prerequisites exist for averting world war and insuring stable peace." And he went on to credit the Soviet peace program with "exerting a favorable influence on the political atmosphere of the planet."

Grechko justified the continued need to strengthen Soviet military might on grounds that "reactionary circles are intensifying the arms race and preparations for world war." In this connection he displayed particular concern over weapons programs in the West and increases in military budgets--subjects that were ignored in his article last year. The same concern was shown in this year's TASS interview on the occasion with Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevskiy.

That the recent show of concern about Western arms programs may be related to deliberations in Moscow on diplomatic and military priorities is suggested by Grechko's failure to mention the goal of ending the arms race and achieving "general and complete disarmament," as he had in last year's PRAVDA article. In KOMMUNIST No. 3, as summarized by TASS two days after the anniversary, Grechko again argued that detente and high levels of defense spending were not incompatible. According to TASS, he maintained that "for peace to become established on our planet, for the Soviet people to build communism at their ease, we must continue to strengthen the country's defense capability and increase the military might of the army and navy."

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MIDDLE EAST

USSR GUARDED ON KISSINGER TRIP, WARNS OF U.S. ECONOMIC AIMS

Soviet media again covered Secretary Kissinger's movements in his latest Middle East visit in brief, factual reports. But, in contrast to treatment of his earlier trips, Moscow has this time forthrightly acknowledged the purpose of the visit to be discussion of Syrian-Israeli disengagement. Moscow has offered no assessment of the prospects for disengagement, although RED STAR on the 24th, reviewing the separation of forces on the Egyptian front, concluded that Israel was gambling that after fulfillment of the disengagement agreement it would be able to drag out for many years the "haggling on the basic question," withdrawal from all territories occupied in 1967.

Moscow has been careful not to criticize the Kissinger mission directly. But Soviet concern over growing U.S. influence in the region came through in carping Moscow comment broadcast in Arabic which cautioned against the "concealed aims" of "American imperialist circles" in the search for a Middle East settlement. The broadcast saw an ominous trend in an influx of American investors in the Arab world. Predictably, Soviet media have remained silent about Moscow's own diplomatic activities, not acknowledging a Brezhnev letter to Syrian President al-Asad delivered on the 26th, according to the Syrian news agency, nor announcing Gromyko's forthcoming visit to Cairo beginning 1 March, as reported by Egyptian media. TASS on the 27th reported Gromyko's departure for Damascus, "in keeping with an earlier reached agreement," on an official visit to Syria. The Syrian news agency reported Gromyko as saying on his arrival that the primary purpose of his visit was to continue consolidating Soviet-Syrian relations. He would "exchange views" on "certain issues" in a manner that would "guarantee the joint mutual interests" of Syria and the Soviet Union, he said.

AMERICAN ROLE

IZVESTIYA on the 21st, in a Washington dispatch on Kissinger's new visit, noted that the agenda was believed to cover three key problems--the POW issue, Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory in the Golan Heights, and the Arab oil embargo. The dispatch conceded that Kissinger's talks in Washington with the Egyptian and Saudi foreign ministers "might lay the foundation for constructive initiatives" to restore calm in the Middle East. Soviet broadcasts in Arabic reported without comment remarks by the Syrian and Egyptian presidents on the Syrian-

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Israeli problem. Thus, a broadcast on the 21st noted that President al-Asad, in an interview with the Lebanese AL-BAYRAQ, said Syria was prepared to release Israeli POWs if Israel allowed the return to their homes of Syrian evacuees from the Golan Heights. And President as-Sadat was reported on the 24th as having expressed confidence, in a press conference in Lahore, that the talks on Syrian-Israeli disengagement would be successful and that this was necessary for the resumption of the Geneva peace conference.

The IZVESTIYA dispatch on the 21st, while giving a cautious nod of approval to Kissinger's talks with the Arab ministers, at the same time accused the United States of "impeding" a peaceful settlement by raising the oil embargo issue as a condition for "activating" further talks on troop disengagement. TASS on the 26th, reporting President Nixon's news conference the previous evening, said he warned that unless the embargo was lifted the United States would slow down its efforts to obtain a peaceful settlement. An Arabic-language commentary on the 26th, without mentioning the President's remarks, noted that there was a request for lifting the oil embargo in exchange for "first steps" which do not even touch on the basic questions of a settlement. Many Arabs, it said, considered this request inconsistent with their right to decide on the means to be used in their struggle and the timing of their actions.

The commentary in Arabic expressed concern over signs of American economic influence in the Arab countries, along with a trend toward increasing "activities of private capital" in Egypt. The broadcast charged that American businessmen, such as David Rockefeller during a recent visit to Cairo, were seeking to invest capital in Arab countries "at the expense of the national sector" in an attack on the "revolutionary social and economic changes" in the Arab world. The commentary added a customary complaint about propaganda "from beyond the ocean" aimed at undermining Arab-Soviet cooperation.

IRAQI-SOVIET TALKS Acknowledgment of Moscow's stepped up Middle East diplomatic activity on another front came in a 27 February TASS report of a communique on the "friendly visit" to the USSR by Iraq's Saddam Husayn. There had been no prior announcement of the 25-27 February visit from either Baghdad or Moscow; it is highly unusual for a communique to be released at the end of previously unreported visits. In the past when Arab leaders have paid "secret visits" to the USSR, Moscow has failed to confirm such visits even after the Arab officials themselves have disclosed the talks.

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TASS in reporting the communique highlighted a passage which "resolutely condemned the attempts of imperialist circles and reactionary forces to retrieve in one form or another their domination and influence in that area," and to prevent the independent development of countries which have embarked on the road of social progress. The communique also stressed the importance of consolidating Arab cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries as "the most important prerequisite" for the success of the Arab struggle against Israeli "aggression." According to TASS' report, the USSR pledged it would give "aid and support" to the Arab states in their just liberation struggle.

The TASS account of the communique touched on the Arab-Israeli conflict only in a routine declaration that a just and lasting peace could not be established without the liberation of all occupied territories and securing the "national rights" of the Palestinian people.

On bilateral relations, TASS' report of the communique made no mention of the Soviet-Iraqi treaty in reaffirming "with satisfaction" the countries' friendly relations and expressing the intention of further developing cooperation in political, economic, and other fields. There was no indication that internal Iraqi affairs were discussed in the talks; Moscow has not commented since mid-January on the Iraqi Government's plan to grant autonomy to Iraqi Kurdistan as of 11 March.

The TASS account noted that Saddam Husayn was received by Brezhnev and had talks with Kosygin. On his last visit to Moscow, in March 1973,* Saddam Husayn had held "cordial and comradely" talks with Kosygin and been received by Brezhnev for a talk held in a "warm and friendly atmosphere." TASS gave no characterization of Saddam Husayn's present talks.

* The March visit was discussed in the FBIS TRENDS of 28 March 1973, pages 16-20.

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MOSCOW WELCOMES LAHORE ISLAMIC SUMMIT RESULTS

Moscow gave only minimal attention to the second Islamic summit conference held in Lahore, Pakistan, on 22-24 February.* Perhaps anticipating criticism of Soviet policies by such leaders as Libya's al-Qadhdhafi, a Moscow broadcast in Arabic on the 20th rebutted "imperialist allegations" that communists were hostile to believers, insisting that Marxists draw the line between exploiters and exploited, not between believers and atheists, and citing examples of Moslem "progressive forces" supporting socialist reforms. An Arabic-language commentary on the 21st predictably found one common element among the Islamic countries--that they suffered from "colonialist imperialist policy based on plunder"--and it stressed the socialist countries' support for the Islamic states' struggle against the "common enemy" of imperialism.

Summing up the conference, a Rassadin commentary broadcast in Persian on the 25th noted that before the summit "various theories and doubts" were expressed about its probable results, but that the final declaration showed the participants had decided to cooperate in the struggle against imperialist exploitation and for national liberation. TASS on the 25th briefly reported that the Lahore Declaration reaffirmed the Arabs' right to liberation of the occupied territories and that the conferees formed a committee to define ways of economic cooperation, protection of natural resources, and strengthening solidarity. The Rassadin commentary, approvingly noting establishment of the committee, added a cautionary note in remarking that "of course," solution of economic problems "is a hard and complicated task."

Moscow greeted Pakistan's recognition of Bangladesh, just prior to the opening of the conference, with "great satisfaction" but without, apparently, any mention of the role of some Islamic nations in mediating the dispute. A commentary broadcast in English to South Asia on the 22d blandly said the recognition was not entirely unexpected and stressed the Soviet Union's "great efforts" to normalize the situation in South Asia.

* Moscow also gave limited publicity to the first Islamic summit, held in Rabat in September 1969.

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INDOCHINA

DRV YOUTH CONFERENCE OPENS; TRUONG CHINH SPEAKS

Following on the heels of the DRV National Assembly session and the DRV trade union congress in the first part of February, the Ho Chi Minh Working Youth Union held a nationwide conference in Hanoi from the 19th to the 23d. This was the first major conclave of the DRV youth organization since March 1961, when it convened its third national congress under its former name, the Vietnam Labor Youth Union. National Assembly Standing Committee Chairman Truong Chinh gave the major address, which elaborated somewhat on the 1974-1975 plan for economic recovery, and youth union First Secretary Vu Quang spoke on the past achievements and current tasks of DRV young people.

TRUONG CHINH SPEECH The publicized portion of Truong Chinh's speech reflected the same emphasis on economic problems seen in the addresses at the recent National Assembly session and the trade union congress.* Truong Chinh prefaced his remarks with a reiteration of "tasks of the North" set forth by the 22d plenum of the Vietnam Workers Party Central Committee--the now standard introduction to any discussion of the DRV economy. He contended that for the next two years these tasks would represent the first step in the process of socialist industrialization, and he said that the production level should equal or surpass "the highest production level of 1965 or 1971."

Describing his remarks as being aimed at helping "you comrades" understand the 22d plenum's resolution, Truong Chinh maintained that socialist industrialization is the means by which the DRV could achieve an "independent and sovereign economy" which in turn would provide a basis for political independence and sovereignty. While asserting that socialist industrialization was the central task in the "transitional period," Truong Chinh echoed the same priorities enumerated by Le Duan in his trade union congress speech: "The key point is to give priority to rationally developing heavy industry while striving to develop agriculture and light industry."

* Hanoi radio, in introducing Truong Chinh's talk, noted that he had also dealt with the "situation in the world and in the country related to the Vietnamese people's great victory in the anti-U.S. national salvation resistance." The radio pointed out that the broadcast portion of his speech on economic rehabilitation for 1974 and 1975 was textual.

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The theme of agricultural production cooperatives, while briefly touched on by both Le Thanh Nghi in his National Assembly report and by Le Duan at the trade union congress, received more detailed attention in Truong Chinh's speech. He argued that even though over 95 percent of the "working people's households" had joined cooperatives by 1972 and more than 96 percent of the cooperatives members had joined large-sized cooperatives, agricultural production cooperatives still could not be considered "consolidated." He complained that in "some localities" cooperatives have collapsed and others only exist in form, "with the peasants returning to individual ways of doing business." To alleviate these shortcomings Truong Chinh recommended, in a list of "urgent tasks" for the party, that the responsibility of the Central Agricultural Commission and the state agricultural commission for the agricultural cooperativization movement be "redefined," and that in those areas where many cooperatives have disintegrated or become ineffective the movement be "rapidly consolidated."

VU QUANG REPORT Broadcast in excerpt form by Hanoi, Vu Quang's address to the conference was described as the youth union Central Committee report on the union's past activities and its tasks for the next two years. Recalling the campaigns in which DRV young people have taken part since the 1961 youth congress, Vu Quang gave only brief treatment to the role they played in the movement to "overfulfill" the first five-year plan but dwelled at length on the "three readies" movement. First launched as a nationwide movement for voluntary military enlistments in March 1965, shortly after U.S. air strikes against the DRV began, the "three readies" called on youths to pledge their readiness to join the army, step up production, and go "anywhere they are needed" to defeat the enemy. However, it was the movement's spirit and its "brilliant manifestation of Vietnam's revolutionary heroism" that Vu Quang underscored in his report, and not its military goals. Later, in what he termed an "immediate task," he called upon "all cadres, members, and youths" to develop this same "three readies" spirit in the new stage.

Vu Quang, dealing with the current specific tasks of the youth movement and youth union, enumerated six requirements, including the need to take part in the movement for productive labor and practicing thrift that was prominently discussed at the recent trade union congress, and the need to heighten the "spirit of revolutionary vigilance" and "satisfactorily perform military duty."

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LEADERSHIP APPEARANCES

Truong Chinh was the only Politburo member who actively participated in the youth conference, although VWP First Secretary Le Duan was reported present at the closing meeting in what was probably a ceremonial appearance. The radio report said that he "cordially talked" with conference participants, but gave no details. Other leaders attending the conference included To Huu and Xuan Thuy, secretaries of the VWP Central Committee, and Le Quang Dao--identified as a member of the VWP Central Committee and deputy secretary of the Central Military Party Committee. A longtime alternate member of the Central Committee, Dao was cited as a full member as early as March 1973.

PRG COUNCIL HEARS REPORTS ON 1973 GAINS, 1974 TASKS

Liberation Radio did not report until 22 February that the PRG Council of Ministers had met on the 5th and 6th at an undisclosed location to "review the situation in the past year and set forth guidelines and tasks for 1974." Reportedly attended by all members of the Council, the meeting heard PRG President Huynh Tan Phat deliver his customary government political report, Defense Minister Tran Nam Trung give the military report, and Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh present a report on "foreign relations activities in 1973." Unlike the Council meetings in January and June 1973, when the full texts of the political and military reports were made public, Vietnamese communist media have to date released only brief summaries of reports at the latest meeting. However, the release of the final communique resumed a practice that was broken after the meeting last June, when communist media failed to publicize a communique.

The current Council communique reviewed the developments of the past year in the "southern part of the country" and routinely accused the United States of sabotaging the Paris agreement by

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CORRECTION

The analysis on the DRV trade union congress that appeared in the TRENDS of 21 February 1973 erroneously stated on page 22 that Nguyen Duc Thuan's concurrent position as secretary general of the Vietnam Federation of Trade Unions Central Committee had "not been previously noted." Nguyen Duc Thuan has held the secretary general position since at least July 1967, when he was so identified in a LAO DONG article.

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continuing its military involvement in the South and by urging Saigon to conduct nibbling and pacification operations "with atrocious and crafty war tricks." The PLAF have dealt "punitive blows" to these "criminal acts" and "gradually recovered the areas illegally occupied by the enemy after 28 January 1973" the communique added, noting that because of these successful PLAF actions, "the tendency toward peace and national reconciliation and concord has been increasingly developed among the enemy troops and some of the enemy officers." Citing the failure of U.S. and Saigon "sabotage" efforts, the communique reiterated in standard terms that the "balance of forces" in the South continued to change in favor of the Vietnamese communists.

The communique indicated that building up of the liberated areas had achieved "striking success" during the past year and that "adequate" grain had been insured through stepped-up production, thus defeating the "enemy's economic blockade policy."

In its discussion of PRG relations with other countries, the communique boasted of "brilliant successes" in 1973 and cited as examples the fact that 15 more countries had "set up their embassies" and "especially" PRG participation and the attendance of President Nguyen Huu Tho at the nonaligned conference in Algiers, where the PRG was recognized as the "sole authentic representative of the South Vietnamese people." The current communique made no reference to appeal for foreign assistance to heal the wounds of war and rebuild the country contained in Huynh Tan Phat's political report at last June's Council meeting, nor was this appeal mentioned in the sketchy summary of Phat's latest political report broadcast by Hanoi media.

In outlining the "directions and tasks" for 1974 the communique dealt in such vague generalities as "continue to hold aloft the banner of the just cause" and "resolutely foil the enemy's plan for conducting nibbling and pacification operations and frustrate all of his schemes and policies." To properly carry out these tasks, the communique asserted, it was important to strengthen and develop the national united front and the spirit of implementing the "basic and long-range" policy of national reconciliation and concord.

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PATHET LAO DUBIOUS THAT COALITION CAN BE FORMED SOON

Lao Patriotic Front media, marking the first anniversary of the Vientiane agreement on 21 February, do not share Royal Lao Government Premier Souvanna Phouma's optimism--expressed in a 21 February speech--that a new Lao coalition government can be formed by 4 or 5 March. The LPF insists instead that many problems remain in the path of coalition, a position consistent with its uncompromising public stance on implementing regulations recently agreed upon for neutralization of Vientiane and Luang Prabang, and its raising of other issues that it claims block establishment of the coalition cabinet and the high-level consultative political council. A possible indication that further LPF discussions of its position may be imminent was the departure from Vientiane for Sam Neua on 27 February of the LPF's permanent negotiating head, Phoun Siprasenuth, reported by the Pathet Lao radio. This radio has ignored Vientiane radio reports alleging that LPF Secretary General Phoumi Vongvichit soon would present an LPF list of cabinet and council members. Hanoi, Peking and Moscow media marked the agreement anniversary with statements or commentaries expressing hope for early formation of the coalition.

Various Pathet Lao radio commentaries, LPF statements and speeches marking the first anniversary maintain that some provisions of the agreement and its subsequent protocol have not been "fully and scrupulously" implemented. An LPF Central Committee 21 February anniversary statement strongly implied that no government would be formed until the RLG withdrew from Vientiane and Luang Prabang all military and paramilitary forces not provided for in the regulations, guaranteed full control of RLG forces in the cities to prevent hostile acts against LPF personnel, issued an official cease-fire order, and ended all air and ground attacks on LPF-controlled territory. In a speech delivered at a rally in Sam Neua the same day, Phoumi Vongvichit also demanded disbandment of the U.S.-sponsored "special forces," the termination of the pacification program, and the removal of Thai mercenaries from the RLG army.

LPF SENSITIVITY ON INVESTITURE	High-level discussion of the legal procedures appropriate for investiture of the new government continues to reflect LPF sensitivities on the issue. Even though in the past Souvanna Phouma has indicated he would accede to LPF demands that the conservative-oriented National Assembly in Vientiane play no
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role in the installation, the LPF exhibits persistent concern that its cabinet ministers list ultimately would be submitted to the assembly for approval.

In a rare mention of Souvanna's difficult position in trying to bring the two extremist parties together, the LPF statement accused "Vientiane extremists" of pressuring Souvanna to support the prerogatives of the assembly under the existing RLG constitution, in an effort to exercise influence on the future government. In his daily speech Phoumi Vongvichit expressly stated that the LPF would oppose these efforts. The LPF does not recognize the authority of the assembly and contends that it will accept only direct investiture by the King, who is mentioned in several favorable contexts in the LPF anniversary materials. The LPF statement contends that the Vientiane accords today represent "the sole supreme constitution." The circumstances in which the formation of the government would take place were described in a discussion broadcast by Pathet Lao radio on the 24th:

If the main fundamental problems are settled and the date of forming the Provisional National Coalition Political Council is fixed, the patriotic forces and the Vientiane government side will simultaneously hand over the lists of their nominees to the two organizations to each other and will present them to His Majesty the King together.

HANOI, PEKING
MOSCOW TREATMENT

Hanoi, Peking and Moscow have continued to express support for the establishment of a coalition government. They responded to the anniversary occasion at varying levels of authority, but the themes were generally the same. Hanoi issued a foreign ministry statement, Peking a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, and Moscow three signed articles in the central press.

The brief 25 February DRV Foreign Ministry statement was restrained in tone and consisted primarily of an endorsement and review of the LPF statement, but a NHAN DAN editorial on the 21st accused the United States and "the Vientiane government"*

* The LPF invariably refers to "the Vientiane ultrareactionaries" in this context.

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of systematically sabotaging the agreement and obstructing negotiations. The editorial reiterated an offer made in a joint statement on VWP First Secretary Le Duan's visit to Sam Neua in November 1973 that the DRV Government was ready to establish "relations of friendship and long-term cooperation" with the new government.

Peking continued its usual low posture in commenting on events in Laos. The 24 February PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article said "some progress" had been achieved in the past year because of the efforts of the LPF and "some enlightened personages of the Vientiane government side," but that implementation of the agreement had encountered "bitter and complicated struggles" instigated by Lao rightist forces.

The signed articles in PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA and RED STAR attacked the actions of the rightist forces but were restrained in their treatment of U.S. involvement. The RED STAR article by Col. A. Leontyev on the 21st, however, took a guarded jab at the United States, mentioning that about one ton of bombs had been dropped in Laos for each inhabitant--the equivalent, he said, of 150 Hiroshima atomic bombs.

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PODGORNY, KOSYGIN CALL BREZHNEV "HEAD" OF CPSU POLITBURO

Brezhnev's two most senior colleagues, Podgornyy and Kosygin, have for the first time publicly acknowledged his primacy in the CPSU Politburo. During a 21 February ceremony in Moscow, both Podgornyy, in presenting an Order of Lenin to Kosygin on his 70th birthday, and Kosygin, in his acceptance speech, spoke of the Politburo "headed by" Brezhnev. A few other Politburo members--Kunayev, Shelepin and Grechko--had used the formula earlier, but it gained currency in the media only after the December 1973 CPSU plenum. Since mid-January the formula has appeared almost daily in the central press.

Kosygin's ranking behind Podgornyy was subtly reflected in the collective message of congratulations which addressed him as a "prominent figure" of the party and state. By contrast, Podgornyy had been addressed on his own 70th birthday last year as a "prominent figure" of the party, state and the international communist movement as well.

BREZHNEV INITIATES ECONOMIC PROGRAM TO AID GEORGIA

Brezhnev has initiated an extensive program of economic aid to Georgia in an effort to bolster the position of First Secretary Shevardnadze, who has been struggling with a variety of intractable political and economic problems since he replaced longtime Georgian party boss Mzhavanadze in September 1972.* Brezhnev's initiative was revealed by Shevardnadze in a 6 February Tbilisi speech that also contained unusual praise for Brezhnev as "the recognized leader [lider] of the party and state." A similar economic program was adopted for Azerbaydzhan shortly after Brezhnev's protege Aliyev assumed the leadership of that faltering republic in 1969.

In a speech at a Tbilisi city party election conference, reported in ZARYA VOSTOKA on 8 February, Shevardnadze disclosed that "in recent days" the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers

* For an analysis of Georgia's problems, see the TRENDS of 22 August 1973, pages 7-9.

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had adopted "on the initiative of L. I. Brezhnev" a decree providing extensive economic aid to the republic. (At a Georgian awards ceremony last October attended by CPSU Politburo member Kirilenko, Shevardnadze had mentioned that an aid program was being prepared on Brezhnev's personal instructions.) The decree, as outlined by the Georgian leader, provides for construction of new industrial enterprises, expansion of existing plants, increased output in light and food industries, specialization in industry and agriculture, and expansion of facilities for tourism. Shevardnadze characterized the decree as "historic" and unprecedented in scope, and he thanked Brezhnev and the Politburo for "fatherly concern" about the development of the Georgian economy.

Shevardnadze's speech was also notable for its disclosures about nationalist unrest and political opposition in Georgia. He complained that some historians persist in treating unfavorably Russia's annexation of Georgia, while presenting Georgian Menshevik leader Zhordaniya, "an inveterate enemy," in positive terms. He even went so far as to reveal that an attempt had been made at the February Tbilisi party conference to rehabilitate a Georgian writer who had defected to Germany in the 1930's and had allegedly become a Nazi propagandist. Shevardnadze ordered the immediate cessation of "any official or unofficial" discussion of the matter at the conference and condemned Georgia's former ideological leaders for allowing agitation in behalf of the defector. He also condemned the "treachery" of Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov, as he had in a speech last October which had also criticized dissidents Chalidze and Yakir.

Shevardnadze indicated he was still facing opposition in Georgian party circles over his purge of Mzhavanadze's followers, both by those opposing the purge and by those favoring its acceleration. While expressing satisfaction that no one had spoken out publicly against the purge, he conceded it had encountered "waverers and even opponents." He also claimed that at recent local party election conferences there were manifestations of "demagogism," "carping criticism," "adventurism" and "slander," as well as criticism of republic leaders. He charged that a party member at one of the local conferences had complained that the purge of old cadres was progressing too slowly, and that vacated posts could easily be filled because Georgia had enough cadres to run a republic of 60 million. Shevardnadze assailed the speaker for classifying old cadres as "Mzhavanadzeites" and rejected his assertion about Georgia's wealth of cadres as "demagogic," "harmful" and "nationalistic."

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NOTE

CUTOFF OF POLISH COAL TO UK: An unprecedented public appeal by the British Communist Party to Polish workers over the head of the Polish regime has apparently succeeded in obtaining a cutoff of Polish coal to Britain. According to a Warsaw PAP announcement on the 22d, a message of solidarity from Polish miners to striking British miners declared that during the strike "Polish coal will not be exported to Great Britain." The British CP paper MORNING STAR on 14 February had voiced the British party's "regret" that the Polish United Workers Party had not acceded to its request to stop shipments of Polish coal to Britain as a gesture of solidarity with the striking miners. The author of the complaint, British CP industrial organizer Bert Ramelson, went to the length of calling on Polish workers to "use industrial action, if necessary" to stop the coal shipments, adding that "our appeal is to the Polish workers, and not to the Polish state." The PAP announcement came, belatedly, two days after the Polish miners' solidarity message had been reported in the 20 February MORNING STAR.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 18 - 24 FEBRUARY 1974

Moscow (3249 items)

Soviet Armed Forces Day	(--)	7%
Chilean Solidarity Week	(3%)	6%
Gromyko in Italy	(--)	5%
China	(6%)	5%
Supreme Soviet Decree on Solzhenitsyn Expulsion	(5%)	5%
Kosygin 70th Birthday	(--)	3%
Middle East	(1%)	3%
[Lahore Islamic Summit	(--)	1%]

Peking (1242 items)

Domestic Issues	(59%)	54%
[Criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius	(12%)	9
Zambia President Kaunda in PRC	(--)	13%
Indochina	(5%)	8%
[Laos Peace Accord	(--)	4
Anniversary		
[Vietnam	(3%)	3
Lahore Islamic Summit	(--)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues: In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.